Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJeitschko, Thomas D.en
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-07T15:38:47Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-07T15:38:47Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047229en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62158-
dc.description.abstractWe consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x2000,18en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen
dc.titleAuctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn723718679en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:200018en

Files in This Item:
File
Size
188.06 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.