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dc.contributor.authorAndor, Marken
dc.contributor.authorFlinkerbusch, Kaien
dc.contributor.authorVoß, Achimen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-05-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-06T12:42:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-06T12:42:52Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62131-
dc.description.abstractIn this article we show how different promotion schemes for renewables affect economic welfare. Our starting point is that external benefits of renewable electricity supply besides the abatement of greenhouse gases are not related to actual electricity generation but to producing and installing capacity. We argue that generation based subsidies such as feed-in tariffs and bonus payments can only be a second-best solution. Our model framework allows us to explain how these second-best instruments cause welfare losses in an environment of volatile demand. We postulate that capacity payments for renewables should be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary social costs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM) |cMünsteren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCAWM Discussion Paper |x59en
dc.subject.jelQ41en
dc.subject.jelQ48en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRenewable Energy Sourcesen
dc.subject.keywordEnergy Policyen
dc.subject.keywordPromotion Instrumentsen
dc.titleQuantities vs. capacities: Minimizing the social cost of renewable energy promotion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn723878978en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cawmdp:59en

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