Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62126 
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dc.contributor.authorCasajus, Andréen
dc.contributor.authorHüttner, Franken
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-22-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T15:19:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T15:19:18Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62126-
dc.description.abstractThe Shapley value certainly is the most eminent single-point solution concept for TU-games. In its standard characterization, the null player property indicates the absence of solidarity among the players. First, we replace the null player property by a new axiom that guarantees null players non-negative payoffs whenever the grand coalition's worth is non-negative. Second, the equal treatment property is strengthened into desirability. This way, we obtain a new characterization of the class of egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. We complement this result by characterizations of the class of generalized consensus values, i.e., of convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal surplus division solution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cLeipzigen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x113en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelD60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSolidarityen
dc.subject.keywordegalitarian Shapley valueen
dc.subject.keywordequal division valueen
dc.subject.keyworddesirabilityen
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized consensus valueen
dc.titleNull players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn722035187en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:leiwps:113en

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