Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62123
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorPull, Kerstinen_US
dc.contributor.authorStadler, Manfreden_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T15:19:08Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T15:19:08Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-63740en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62123-
dc.description.abstractWe study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms' surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. Tübingen |cTübingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aUniversity of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance |x43en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordStrategic delegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordAgency theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordRevenue sharingen_US
dc.titleStrategic delegation in price competitionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn722534108en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuewef:43-

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