Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62123 
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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorPull, Kerstinen
dc.contributor.authorStadler, Manfreden
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-29-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T15:19:08Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T15:19:08Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-63740en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62123-
dc.description.abstractWe study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms' surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences |cTübingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aUniversity of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance |x43en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordStrategic delegationen
dc.subject.keywordAgency theoryen
dc.subject.keywordRevenue sharingen
dc.titleStrategic delegation in price competition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn722534108en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuewef:43en

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