Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62075
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dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten_US
dc.contributor.authorAytimur, R. Emreen_US
dc.contributor.authorBoukouras, Aristotelisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T08:15:54Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T08:15:54Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62075-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts that smaller communities have more volatile turnout than larger communities.en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Voting |xA09-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleVoting as a Signaling Deviceen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn731578996-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62075-

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