Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62047
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dc.contributor.authorGöller, Danielen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T08:15:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T08:15:23Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62047-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the efficiency of the standard breach remedy expectation damages in a setting of bilateral cooperative investment by a buyer and a seller. Contracts may specify a required quality level and an upper bound to the cost of production. We find that it is optimal to write an augmented Cadillac contract that sets one threshold such that it cannot be met with positive probability together with an extreme price. Then, one of the parties becomes a residual claimant of the trade relationship. The other threshold can be used to balance the incentives of the other party.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Theoretical Law and Economics |xC05-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleExpectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investmentsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn731525159-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62047-

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