Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62047
Authors: 
Göller, Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Theoretical Law and Economics C05-V1
Abstract: 
We examine the efficiency of the standard breach remedy expectation damages in a setting of bilateral cooperative investment by a buyer and a seller. Contracts may specify a required quality level and an upper bound to the cost of production. We find that it is optimal to write an augmented Cadillac contract that sets one threshold such that it cannot be met with positive probability together with an extreme price. Then, one of the parties becomes a residual claimant of the trade relationship. The other threshold can be used to balance the incentives of the other party.
JEL: 
K12
C70
D86
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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