Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62039
Authors: 
Jovanovic, Dragan
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Antitrust Issues and Competition C21-V3
Abstract: 
We analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. A novelty of the paper is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We find that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all firms are partially owned by the government. When partially public firms compete with private firms, the effects on managerial incentives crucially depend on the degree of competitive pressure. Thereby, PPO induces either partially public firms or their private competitors to offer stronger managerial incentives. This result is essentially confirmed even if the government's primary concern is consumer protection rather than social welfare.
JEL: 
D82
H32
L13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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