Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62038
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKe, Changxiaen_US
dc.contributor.authorMorath, Florianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T08:15:10Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T08:15:10Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62038-
dc.description.abstractThe generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members fight against each other about the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former brothers in arms fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Further, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share equally and peacefully.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Political Alliances and Federations |xD19-V3en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleBrothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzleen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn731473590-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62038-

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