Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62035 
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dc.contributor.authorRannenberg, Ansgaren
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-04T08:15:05Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-04T08:15:05Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62035-
dc.description.abstractI add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the overall economy to monetary policy and productivity shocks. It allows my model to match the volatility and correlation with output of the external finance premium, bank leverage, entrepreneurial leverage and other variables in US data better than a BGG-type model. A reasonably calibrated combination of balance sheet shocks produces a downturn of a magnitude similar to the "Great Recession".en
dc.language.isogeren
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Banking and Macroeconomics |xB15-V1en
dc.subject.jelE20en
dc.subject.jelE44en
dc.subject.jelE30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleAsymmetric Information in Credit Markets, Bank Leverage Cycles and Macroeconomic Dynamics-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn730347079en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:62035en

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