Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62028
Authors: 
Flotho, Stefanie
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Monetary Policy E17-V3
Abstract: 
This paper explicitly models strategic interaction between two independent national fiscal authorities and a single central bank in a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union. Monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Coordination of fiscal policies does not always lead to the best welfare effects. It depends on the nature of the shocks whether governments prefer to coordinate or not coordinate. The size of the government multipliers depend on the combination of the intraunion competitiveness parameters. They get larger in case of implementation lags of fiscal policy.
JEL: 
E52
E61
E63
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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