Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61784
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Ivanova, Radosveta
Königstein, Manfred
Strobel, Martin
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1999,70
Abstract: 
We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We find that within the time horizon which we investigate, learning does not drive toward risk neutral equilibrium bidding and characterize some features of observed learning: Bid functions are adjusted globally rather than locally, decision time matches the sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid adjustments. The evidence supports a cognitive approach to learning.
Subjects: 
Learning
Auctions
Fair Division Games
JEL: 
D44
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
468.72 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.