Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61770
Authors: 
Anderhub, Vital
Güth, Werner
Engelmann, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1999,97
Abstract: 
In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity and then, in the latter case, player 2 between exploiting player 1 or rewarding him. In our experiment, player 2 can be a notorically rewarding player (this type is implemented as a robot strategy) or a human participant who may decide opportunistically. To allow for reputation formation, this game is played repeatedly. Learning can be analysed since participants play successively several repeated games with changed partners. In our computerized experiment, participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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