Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61755
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Oechssler, Jörg
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1999,57
Abstract: 
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.
JEL: 
C72
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.57 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.