Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/61722 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 1999,101
Publisher: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Abstract: 
In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction types (first versus second price - auction versus fair division game) repeteadly. Due to the strategy method (one bids before learning one's private value) we can investigate the slope and curvature of individual bid functions) the evidence for risk aversion, the comparative statics with respect to the game type, the price expectations and the efficiency rates.
Subjects: 
auctions
fair division games
bid function
JEL: 
D44
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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