Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61707
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Tjotta, Sigve
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1999,92
Abstract: 
Empirical studies in family economics usually rely on questionnaires, statistical or panel data. Here we try to study experimentally some crucial aspects of engaging in a marriage. First the female partner can end the relationship or suggest one of the two forms of joint venture. Whereas a full engagement relies on more specialization, but makes her more exploitable by the male partner, a low engagement is less productive, but also fairer. More specifically, the random profit of a joint venture is allocated by ultimatum bargaining in case of a full engagement whereas demands are determined simultaneously in case of a low engagement. Partners interact anonymously. In the repetition the two partners in a matching group of four participants are exchanged. Our treatment variables are her and his outside option value representing gender specific investments in human capital.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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