Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/61050 
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dc.contributor.authorBrunner, Johann K.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-07-
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T10:37:55Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T10:37:55Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/61050-
dc.description.abstractI study a model of a representative individual who has a motive for leaving bequests and is at risk of needing long-term care in old age. I assume - as is typical for OECD countries - that the individual is not fully insured against this risk. Moreover, at realization the individual is unable to adapt labor supply or consumption; then expenditures for long-term care result in a one-to-one reduction of the estate. In this situation a tax on bequests provides insurance and its introduction causes a smaller deadweight loss than an income or consumption tax. I also characterize the optimal tax and transfer system in this model.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3901en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH24en
dc.subject.jelI13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordestate taxen
dc.subject.keywordlong-term care insuranceen
dc.subject.stwErbschaftsteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwPflegeversicherungen
dc.subject.stwErbeen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe bequest tax as long-term care insurance-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn720738431en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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