Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61050
Autoren: 
Brunner, Johann K.
Datum: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3901
Zusammenfassung: 
I study a model of a representative individual who has a motive for leaving bequests and is at risk of needing long-term care in old age. I assume - as is typical for OECD countries - that the individual is not fully insured against this risk. Moreover, at realization the individual is unable to adapt labor supply or consumption; then expenditures for long-term care result in a one-to-one reduction of the estate. In this situation a tax on bequests provides insurance and its introduction causes a smaller deadweight loss than an income or consumption tax. I also characterize the optimal tax and transfer system in this model.
Schlagwörter: 
estate tax
long-term care insurance
JEL: 
H21
H24
I13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
236.75 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.