Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61010
Authors: 
Aytimur, R. Emre
Boukouras, Aristotelis
Schwager, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3900
Abstract: 
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Thus, the median voters' ideal policy may not obtain in contested elections if policy control is imperfect, even when the cost of running as a candidate is arbitrarily small.
Subjects: 
elections
polarization
strategic delegation
bureaucracy
foreign influence
JEL: 
D72
D78
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
211.48 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.