Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61000
Authors: 
Baumann, Florian
Friehe, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3888
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes private precautions against crime when the value of the property to be protected is private information. Within a framework in which potential criminals can choose between various crime opportunities, we establish that decentralized decision-making by potential victims may lead to suboptimal levels of investment in private protection. Specifically, suboptimal investment can occur when observable precautions communicate information about property value to potential offenders, even when the diversion effect of private safety measures is taken into account.
JEL: 
D62
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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