Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/60868 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Staff Report No. 457
Publisher: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY
Abstract: 
This paper explores the advantages of a new financial charter for large, complex, internationally active financial institutions that would address the corporate governance challenges of such organizations, including incentive problems in risk decisions and the complicated corporate and regulatory structures that impede cross-border resolutions. The charter envisions a single entity with broad powers in which the extent and timing of compensation are tied to financial results, senior managers and risk takers form a new risk-bearing stakeholder class, and a home-country-based resolution regime operates for the benefit of all creditors. The proposal is offered 1) to highlight the point that even in the face of a more efficient and effective resolution process, incentives for excessive risk taking will continue unless the costs of risk decisions are internalized by institutions, 2) to suggest another avenue for moving toward a streamlined organizational structure and single global resolution process, and 3) to complement other proposals aimed at preserving a large role for market discipline and firm incentives in a post-reform financial system.
Subjects: 
Financial regulatory reform
corporate governance
bank charter
bank insolvency
JEL: 
G20
G21
G28
G38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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