Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60829
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dc.contributor.authorCogley, Timothyen_US
dc.contributor.authorMatthes, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorSbordone, Argia M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:35:07Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:35:07Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60829-
dc.description.abstractWe model transitional dynamics that emerge after the adoption of a new monetary policy rule. We assume that private agents learn about the new policy via Bayesian updating, and we study how learning affects the nature of the transition and the choice of a new rule. Temporarily explosive dynamics can emerge when there is substantial disagreement between actual and perceived policies. These dynamics make the transition highly volatile and dominate expected loss. The emergence of temporarily explosive paths depends more on uncertainty about policy-feedback parameters than about the long-run inflation target. For that reason, the central bank can at least achieve low average inflation. Its ability to move feedback parameters away from initial beliefs, however, is more constrained.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York |x524en_US
dc.subject.jelE31en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinflationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy reformsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransitionsen_US
dc.titleOptimal disinflation under learningen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn675784476en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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