Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/60700 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Staff Report No. 229
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a tractable model to study monetary policy under discretion. We restrict our analysis to Markov equilibria. We find that for all parametrizations with an equilibrium inflation rate of about 2 percent, there is a second equilibrium with an inflation rate just above 10 percent. Thus, the model can simultaneously account for the low and high inflation episodes in the United States. We carefully characterize the set of Markov equilibria along the parameter space and find our results to be robust, suggesting that expectation traps are more than just a theoretical curiosity.
Schlagwörter: 
expectation traps
monetary policy discretion
inflation
JEL: 
E31
E52
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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