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dc.contributor.authorMorgan, Donald P.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:28:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:28:33Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60671-
dc.description.abstractWe define predatory lending as a welfare-reducing provision of credit. Using a textbook model, we show that lenders profit if they can tempt households into “debt traps,” that is, overborrowing and delinquency. We then test whether payday lending fits our definition of predatory. We find that in states with higher payday loan limits, less educated households and households with uncertain income are less likely to be denied credit, but are not more likely to miss a debt payment. Absent higher delinquency, the extra credit from payday lenders does not fit our definition of predatory. Nevertheless, it is expensive. On that point, we find somewhat lower payday prices in cities with more payday stores per capita, consistent with the hypothesis that competition limits payday loan prices.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report |x273en
dc.subject.jelG18en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelD14en
dc.subject.jelD18en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpredatory, payday, consumeren
dc.subject.stwVerbraucherkrediten
dc.subject.stwHypotheken
dc.subject.stwWucheren
dc.subject.stwPrivate Verschuldungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleDefining and detecting predatory lending-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn526660597en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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