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dc.contributor.authorFleming, Michael J.en
dc.contributor.authorGarbade, Kenneth D.en
dc.contributor.authorKeane, Franken
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:25:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:25:25Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60560-
dc.description.abstractWe show that Treasury bill auction procedures create classes of price-equivalent discount rates for bills with fewer than seventy-two days to maturity. We argue that it is inefficient for market participants to bid at a discount rate that is not the minimum rate in its class. The inefficiency of bidding at a rate other than the minimum is related to a quantity shortfall rather than an unexploited profit opportunity. Auction results for weekly offerings of four-week bills and occasional offerings of cash management bills show that market participants frequently bid at inefficient rates. However, they are more likely to bid at efficient rates than chance would suggest.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report |x184en
dc.subject.jelG14en
dc.subject.jelH63en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwSchatzpapieren
dc.subject.stwAuktionen
dc.titleAnomalous bidding in short-term treasury bill auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn389506419en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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