Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60524
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dc.contributor.authorMartin, Antoineen_US
dc.contributor.authorMcAndrews, Jamesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:24:03Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:24:03Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60524-
dc.description.abstractWe study the incentives of participants in a real-time gross settlement system with and without the addition of a liquidity-saving mechanism (queue). Participants in our model face a liquidity shock and different costs for delaying payments. They trade off the cost of delaying a payment against the cost of borrowing liquidity from the central bank. The heterogeneity of participants in our model gives rise to a rich set of strategic interactions. The main contribution of our paper is to show that the design of a liquidity-saving mechanism has important implications for welfare, even in the absence of netting. In particular, we find that parameters will determine whether the addition of a liquiditysaving mechanism increases or decreases welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York |x282en_US
dc.subject.jelE42en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordliquidity-saving mechanism, real-time gross settlement, large-value payment systemsen_US
dc.subject.stwZahlungsverkehren_US
dc.subject.stwVerrechnungsverkehren_US
dc.subject.stwBankenliquiditäten_US
dc.subject.stwGeldmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwLiquiditätseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLiquidity-saving mechanismsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn540108537en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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