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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/60389
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Krämer, Jan | en |
dc.contributor.author | Vogelsang, Ingo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-08-13T10:39:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-08-13T10:39:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60389 | - |
dc.description.abstract | With the use of a laboratory experiment, we show the effects of co-investments on coverage, competition and price collusion in regulated network industries. On the one hand, co-investments turn out not to be a significant driver of new infrastructure investments beyond the level achieved by access regulation and they seem to facilitate tacit price collusion. On the other hand, co-investments economize on infrastructure investment costs and necessitate communication, which partially offset the aforementioned effects. In fact, communication between the firms on their future coverage, especially outside co-investments, seems to have a positive effect on investments. However, the surprising message of the experiment is that tacit collusion happens under co-investment although there is no reason to believe that it should and although we made almost every effort to prevent it. Our results indicate that regulators should evaluate co-investments with scrutiny as there are definite drawbacks that must be considered. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInternational Telecommunications Society (ITS) |cCalgary | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |a23rd European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Vienna, Austria, 1st-4th July, 2012 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L50 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L97 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experimental economics | en |
dc.subject.keyword | network industries | en |
dc.subject.keyword | co-investment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | collusion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | regulation | en |
dc.title | Co-investments and tacit collusion in regulated network industries: Experimental evidence | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 720905672 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:itse12:60389 | en |
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