Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/60192 
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dc.contributor.authorLibman, Alexanderen
dc.contributor.authorKozlov, Vladimiren
dc.contributor.authorSchultz, Andréen
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-11-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-26T09:17:19Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-26T09:17:19Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60192-
dc.description.abstractThe paper investigates the influence of outside options on the predatory behavior of autocrats. An outside option is referred to as the opportunity of an incumbent ruler to continue his career outside his current territory of control. The paper uses data on the effectiveness of tax collection and the repressiveness of tax jurisprudence for Russian regions in 2007-2009 and finds that regions ruled by governors with substantial outside options are characterized by more repressive behavior of tax authorities. However, surprisingly, the same tax authorities collect less additional revenues for the public budget. It conjectures that the presence of an outside option induces autocrats to behave like roving bandits they use tax audits to establish control over regional companies, but exploit this control to extract private rents rather than revenues for the regional budget used for public goods provision.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFrankfurt School of Finance & Management |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFrankfurt School - Working Paper Series |x190en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelP26en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordroving and stationary banditen
dc.subject.keywordtax auditingen
dc.subject.keywordpredatory governmenten
dc.subject.keywordRussian federalismen
dc.subject.stwFinanzverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwRegionalverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwAutoritäres Systemen
dc.subject.stwSteuerliche Betriebsprüfungen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwRusslanden
dc.titleRoving bandits in action: Outside option and governmental predation in autocracies-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn719261708en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:190en

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