Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59733
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dc.contributor.authorAnsink, Eriken_US
dc.contributor.authorGengenbach, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeikard, Hans-Peteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-13T14:52:51Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-13T14:52:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59733-
dc.description.abstractWe analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development |x17.2012en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelQ25en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRiver Sharingen_US
dc.subject.keywordWater Tradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarket Emergenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordProperty Rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Stabilityen_US
dc.titleRiver sharing and water tradeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn715901982en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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