Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59733 
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dc.contributor.authorAnsink, Eriken
dc.contributor.authorGengenbach, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorWeikard, Hans-Peteren
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-18-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-13T14:52:51Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-13T14:52:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59733-
dc.description.abstractWe analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x17.2012en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelQ25en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRiver Sharingen
dc.subject.keywordWater Tradeen
dc.subject.keywordMarket Emergenceen
dc.subject.keywordProperty Rightsen
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Stabilityen
dc.titleRiver sharing and water trade-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715901982en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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