Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59715 
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dc.contributor.authorBosetti, Valentinaen
dc.contributor.authorCarraro, Carloen
dc.contributor.authorDe Cian, Enricaen
dc.contributor.authorMassetti, Emanueleen
dc.contributor.authorTavoni, Massimoen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-23-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-13T14:52:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-13T14:52:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59715-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions' profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and potential stability of a number of coalitions which are potentially effective in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even potentially stable even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x97.2011en
dc.subject.jelC68en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD58en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordClimate Policyen
dc.subject.keywordClimate Coalitionen
dc.subject.keywordGame Theoryen
dc.subject.keywordFree Ridingen
dc.subject.stwKlimaveränderungen
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleIncentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn683945076en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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