Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59690 
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dc.contributor.authorde Castro, Luciano I.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-19-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59690-
dc.description.abstractAffiliation has been a prominent assumption in the study of economic models with statistical dependence. Despite its large number of applications, especially in auction theory, affiliation has limitations that are important to be aware of. This paper shows that affiliation is a restrictive condition and the intuition usually given for its adoption may be misleading. Also, other usual justifications for affiliation are not compelling. Moreover, some implications of affiliation do not generalize to other definitions of positive dependence. These results show the need to consider alternatives to affiliation. The results of this paper suggest new directions for the study of dependence in economics. The main result classifies economic models of information and proves the existence of a minimally informative random variable that makes types conditionally independent. If this variable is known, then all results that are valid under independence are also valid for these models with statistically dependent types. Complementing this result, we describe a method to study general forms of dependence using grid distributions, which are distributions whose densities are constant in squares. This method allows a comprehensive investigation on the revenue ranking of auctions under general dependence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1479en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordaffiliationen
dc.subject.keywordpositive dependenceen
dc.subject.keywordstatistical dependence of typesen
dc.subject.keywordconditional independenceen
dc.subject.keywordde Finetti's theoremen
dc.subject.keywordminimally informative random variableen
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen
dc.subject.keywordpure strategy equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordrevenue rankingen
dc.titleAffiliation and dependence in economic models-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610644424en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1479en

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