Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59677
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dc.contributor.authorAtakan, Alp E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorEkmekci, Mehmeten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:21Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:21Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59677-
dc.description.abstractCripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1510en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRepeated Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordReputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordEqual Discount Factoren_US
dc.subject.keywordLong-run Playersen_US
dc.subject.keywordWar of Attritionen_US
dc.titleA two-sided reputation result with long runen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn637698347en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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