Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59677 
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dc.contributor.authorAtakan, Alp E.en
dc.contributor.authorEkmekci, Mehmeten
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:21Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:21Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59677-
dc.description.abstractCripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1510en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRepeated Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordReputationen
dc.subject.keywordEqual Discount Factoren
dc.subject.keywordLong-run Playersen
dc.subject.keywordWar of Attritionen
dc.titleA two-sided reputation result with long run-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn637698347en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1510en

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