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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1510
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Cripps et al. (2005) conjectured that in an infinitely repeated game with two equally patient players, if there is positive probability that the players could be Stackelberg types, then equilibrium behavior would resemble a war of attrition, i.e., a two-sided reputation result would hold. In this note we show that this conjecture is indeed true for a wide set of stage games for which the one-sided reputation result of Atakan and Ekmekci (2008) holds.
Schlagwörter: 
Repeated Games
Reputation
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
War of Attrition
JEL: 
C73
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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