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dc.contributor.authorDziuda, Wiolettaen
dc.contributor.authorLoeper, Antoineen
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:18Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59674-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo, determining the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest and decreases the responsiveness of the bargaining outcome to the environment. In some cases, it can lead the negotiations to complete gridlock. Compared to a bargaining protocol with an exogenous status quo, the status quo stays in place more often and equilibrium welfare is lower. In a legislative setting, this model shows that the inertial effect of the endogenous status quo can be mitigated by concentrating decision power, and can be eliminated by sunset provisions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1514en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddynamic votingen
dc.subject.keywordendogenous status quoen
dc.subject.keywordpartisanshipen
dc.subject.keywordpolarizationen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy inertiaen
dc.subject.keywordsunset provisionen
dc.subject.keywordchecks and balancesen
dc.titleDynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn641442947en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1514en

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