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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården_US
dc.description.abstractI develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. If the agents can contract on provision levels, but not on investments, they invest suboptimally little, particularly if the contract is short-term or close to its expiration date. To encourage sufficient investments, the optimal and equilibrium contract is more ambitious if it is short-lasting, and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date. If renegotiation is possible, such a contract implements the first best. The results have important implications for how to design a climate treaty.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1504en_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic private provision of public goodsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic common-pool problemsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic hold-up problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenegotiation designen_US
dc.subject.keywordclimate change and climate agreementsen_US
dc.titleIncomplete contracts in dynamic gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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