Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59669
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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:14Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59669-
dc.description.abstractI investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation. On the one hand, allowing side payments may be necessary when one party's participation constraint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints a delegate that values the project less, because this increases her bargaining power. Reluctant agents, in turn, implement too few projects. I show that side payments are bad if the heterogeneity is small while the uncertainty and the typical value of the project are large.With a larger number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments, but delegation becomes more strategic as well, and cooperation decreases in either caseen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1452en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenentscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwKompensationslösungen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDo side payments help? Collective decisions and strategic delegationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587665408en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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