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dc.contributor.authorGalperti, Simoneen
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:03Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:03Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59663-
dc.description.abstractWe study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs. flexibility. The first-best contracts under complete information allow to successfully commit to the optimal level of flexibility. Importantly, this outcome is robust to small amounts of unobservable heterogeneity. When individuals differ substantially in their self control, under asymmetric information highly time-inconsistent agents exert a positive externality on low time-inconsistent fellows. Its magnitude depends on the degree of contractual flexibility and the likelihood of facing temptation. We derive the optimal screening mechanism and characterize its distortions. We analyze the inefficiency of the monopolist's offers in terms of the induced balance between commitment and flexibility.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1520en
dc.subject.jelD42en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelD91en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtime inconsistencyen
dc.subject.keywordself-controlen
dc.subject.keywordcommitmenten
dc.subject.keywordflexibilityen
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen
dc.subject.keywordscreeningen
dc.subject.keywordinformation externalitiesen
dc.titleContracting over commitment vs. flexibility under asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn651735718en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1520en

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