Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59651
Authors: 
Angeletos, George-Marios
Pavan, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1496
Abstract: 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether the heightened inertia and volatility are socially undesirable, whether there is room for policies that correct the way agents use information in equilibrium, and what are the welfare effects of the information disseminated by the media or policy makers. We argue that a key to answering all these questions is the relation between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination. The former summarizes the private value from aligning individual decisions, whereas the latter summarizes the value that society assigns to such an alignment once all externalities are internalized.
Subjects: 
dispersed information
coordination
complementarities
volatility
inertia, efficiency
JEL: 
C72
D62
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
136.8 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.