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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1507
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient player 1 can leverage player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest payoff in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
Schlagwörter: 
Repeated Games
Reputation
Equal Discount Factor
Long-run Players
JEL: 
C73
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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