Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59640
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dc.contributor.authorGossner, Olivieren_US
dc.contributor.authorKalai, Ehuden_US
dc.contributor.authorWeber, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-04en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:46Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59640-
dc.description.abstractIn Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence (the opponents' types are independent conditional on one's own) and (ii) type disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective independence is motivated by its implications in Bayesian games and in studies of equilibrium concepts. We find that a variable that disassociates types is more informative than any common-knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent. They also imply that any variable which is common knowledge to two agents is common knowledge to all, and imply the existence of a unique common-knowledge variable that disassociates types, which is the one defined by Aumann.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1476en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBayesian gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordindependent typesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.stwBayes-Statistiken_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInformation independence and common knowledgeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608267473en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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