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dc.contributor.authorImmorlica, Nicoleen_US
dc.contributor.authorKalai, Adam Taumanen_US
dc.contributor.authorLucier, Brendanen_US
dc.contributor.authorMoitra, Ankuren_US
dc.contributor.authorPostlewaite, Andrewen_US
dc.contributor.authorTennenholtz, Mosheen_US
dc.description.abstractWe revisit classic algorithmic search and optimization problems from the perspective of competition. Rather than a single optimizer minimizing expected cost, we consider a zero-sum game in which an optimization problem is presented to two players, whose only goal is to outperform the opponent. Such games are typically exponentially large zero-sum games, but they often have a rich combinatorial structure. We provide general techniques by which such structure can be leveraged to find minmax-optimal and approximate minmax-optimal strategies. We give examples of ranking, hiring, compression, and binary search duels, among others. We give bounds on how often one can beat the classic optimization algorithms in such duels.en_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1545en_US
dc.titleDueling algorithmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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