Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628
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dc.contributor.authorGonzález-Díaz, Julioen_US
dc.contributor.authorMeléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628-
dc.description.abstractOften, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |x1446en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-cooperative game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium conceptsen_US
dc.subject.keywordperfect bayesianen_US
dc.subject.keywordBayes ruleen_US
dc.titleOn the notion of perfect bayesian equilibriumen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587664002en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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