Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628 
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dc.contributor.authorGonzález-Díaz, Julioen
dc.contributor.authorMeléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:37Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628-
dc.description.abstractOften, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1446en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnon-cooperative game theoryen
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium conceptsen
dc.subject.keywordperfect bayesianen
dc.subject.keywordBayes ruleen
dc.titleOn the notion of perfect bayesian equilibrium-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587664002en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1446en

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