Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1446
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible”. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible” means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
non-cooperative game theory
equilibrium concepts
perfect bayesian
Bayes rule
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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