Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59621 
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dc.contributor.authorGarrett, Danielen
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-22-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:33:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:33:32Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59621-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the managers' tenure in the firm. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is efficient, the profit-maximizing policy either induces excessive retention (i.e., inefficiently low turnover) at all tenure levels, or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1490en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial turnoveren
dc.subject.keywordtermination clausesen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic mechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.titleManagerial turnover in a changing world-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn637425286en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1490en

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