Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59510 
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dc.contributor.authorAndres, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorFernau, Eriken
dc.contributor.authorTheissen, Eriken
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-18-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-28T09:51:33Z-
dc.date.availablestart=2012-06-28T09:51:33Z; end=2013-08-27-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59510-
dc.description.abstractIn the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is common practice for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. As members of the supervisory board, they are involved in setting the pay for their successors as well as for their former colleagues. We analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms and the period 1998-2007. We show that firms in which a former CEO serves as the chairman of the board of directors pay their executives significantly more. We find no difference in the compensation for the members of the supervisory board. Thus, former CEOs apparently exert their influence to increase the pay of their former colleagues and their successor, but not their own pay.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR) |cCologneen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCFR Working Paper |x12-02en
dc.subject.jelG30en
dc.subject.jelG38en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexecutive compensationen
dc.subject.keywordboard structureen
dc.subject.keywordtwo-tiered boarden
dc.subject.stwManagervergütungen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsraten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleIs it better to say goodbye? When former executives set executive pay-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn717850889en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1202en

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