Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59510 
Titel: 

Is it better to say goodbye? When former executives set executive pay

Dokument gelöscht auf Wunsch der Autor:in bzw. der Herausgeber:in.

Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 12-02
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
In the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, it is common practice for chief executive officers (CEOs) to become the chairman of the supervisory board of the same company upon retirement. As members of the supervisory board, they are involved in setting the pay for their successors as well as for their former colleagues. We analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms and the period 1998-2007. We show that firms in which a former CEO serves as the chairman of the board of directors pay their executives significantly more. We find no difference in the compensation for the members of the supervisory board. Thus, former CEOs apparently exert their influence to increase the pay of their former colleagues and their successor, but not their own pay.
Schlagwörter: 
executive compensation
board structure
two-tiered board
JEL: 
G30
G38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Dokument gelöscht auf Wunsch der Autor:in bzw. der Herausgeber:in am: 27. August 2013
Mit dieser Publikation sind keine Dateien verknüpft.


Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.