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dc.contributor.authorCarbonell-Nicolau, Oriolen_US
dc.contributor.authorMcLean, Richard P.en_US
dc.description.abstractWe prove the existence of strategically stable sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence the existence of pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibria) in potential games that admit an upper semicontinuous potential, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. In addition, we provide a link between upper semicontinuity of a potential and conditions defined directly on the payoff functions of a potential game. Finally, we show that stable sets and (strictly) perfect equilibria are related to the set of maximizers of a potential, which refines the set of Nash equilibria. Specifically, the set of maximizers of a potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (and hence a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium) and, for generic games, any maximizer of a potential is a pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibrium.en_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey |cNew Brunswick, NJen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |x2011,25en_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscontinuous gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordpotential gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrembling-hand perfect equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordstable seten_US
dc.subject.keywordessential equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.titleRefinements of Nash equilibrium in potential gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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