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dc.contributor.authorBaliga, Sandeepen
dc.contributor.authorSjostrom, Tomasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T12:01:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T12:01:52Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494-
dc.description.abstractTwo decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2009-06en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordglobal strategyen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten
dc.subject.stwPolitische Gewalten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe strategy of manipulating conflict-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612504107en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:200906en

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