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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Baliga, Sandeep | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sjostrom, Tomas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-11-10 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-25T12:01:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJ | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x2009-06 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C7 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | global strategy | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politischer Konflikt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Gewalt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The strategy of manipulating conflict | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 612504107 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:rut:rutres:200906 | en |
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