Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59485 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-25T11:57:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-25T11:57:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59485-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we try to understand the phenomena whereby a large proportion of the population evades tax payments. We present a model which incorporates elements from the theory of information cascades with the standard model of tax evasion and analyze the connection between the decision of a potential tax evader, the number of tax evaders and the number caught in previous periods. General conditions exist under which any expected utility maximizing potential tax evaders will decide to emulate other tax evaders.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2009-02en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelH31en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax evasionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation cascadesen
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerkriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwErwartungsnutzenen
dc.subject.stwHerdenverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhy pay taxes when no one else does?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612503011en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:rut:rutres:200902en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
88.52 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.